The Impact of Turkey's Membership on EU Voting. CEPS Policy Briefs No. 62, 1 February 2005 by Baldwin, Richard & Widgrén, Mika.
 
Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the authors in a personal capacity and not to any 
institution with which they are associated. 
 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.be) 
© 2005, Baldwin and Widgrén 
T
h
i
n
k
i
n
g
 
a
h
e
a
d
 
f
o
r
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
 
 
The Impact of Turkey’s Membership 
on EU Voting 
Richard Baldwin and Mika Widgrén 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This policy brief investigates the decision-making impact of admitting Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and 
Croatia into the EU-25, focusing on the EU’s ‘capacity to act’ and the power distribution among the 
member states. The enlargement is projected to have relatively little impact on the EU’s capacity to act, 
as long as the Constitutional Treaty (CT) voting rules come into effect, but if the CT is rejected, 
enlargement would cripple EU decision-making. Turkish membership is calculated to have a big impact 
on the power distribution among member states. Under the Nice or CT voting rules, Turkey would be the 
second-most powerful member state in an EU-29. Under the CT rules, Turkey would be substantially 
more powerful than France, Italy and the UK, while under the Nice rules, the power differences among 
the member states with populations of more than 50 million would be small. Plainly, this distribution of 
power might decrease the acceptability of the Constitutional Treaty or Turkey’s membership (or both). 
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CEPS Policy Brief No. 62/February 2005 
Richard Baldwin and Mika Widgrén 
1. Introduction 
The Treaty of Nice in 2001 and the Constitutional Treaty in 2004 radically reformed the Council of 
Ministers’ voting rules.
1 Political acceptance of the Constitutional Treaty rules was achieved at the 
Brussels summit in June 2004. Soon after, the Nice Treaty rules came into effect in November 2004. 
The changes made in the Constitutional Treaty were postponed by five years and even that requires 
that the Constitution is ratified in all 25 member states. The next enlargement is ‘pencilled-in’ for 
2007, when Bulgaria and Romania should enter the Union. Thus, they will enter under the current 
Nice rules but the next new members are likely to join under the rules of the Constitutional Treaty. 
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of Turkey’s membership on EU voting. The aspects that we 
discuss are decision-making efficiency and the distribution of power in the EU’s leading decision-
making body, the Council of Ministers. We compare two alternative Council voting rules: those 
accepted in the Treaty of Nice and implemented by the Accession Treaty for the 10 entrants in 2004 
and the rules that are laid down in the Constitutional Treaty. 
2.  Council of Ministers’ voting reforms 
The Constitutional Treaty explicitly sets out two frameworks for the Council’s voting procedure and 
implicitly recognises the current system set up by the Accession Treaty (Art. 24) as detailed below. 
Up to 31 October 2004 
The pre-Treaty of Nice voting rules applied, i.e. qualified majority voting with weighted votes and the 
old majority threshold of 71% to win. The numbers of votes for the EU-15 member states were 
unchanged; those for the 10 newcomers were a simple interpolation of EU-15 votes as specified in the 
Accession Treaty.  
From 1 November 2004 to 31 October 2009  
The Nice Treaty voting rules apply (as per the Draft Council Decision relating to the implementation 
of Article I-24).
2 The Nice rules maintain the basic qualified-majority voting framework, but add two 
extra criteria concerning the number of yes-voters and the population they represent. Specifically, the 
vote threshold is 72.2% of the Council votes (232 of the 321 votes), the member threshold is 50% of 
the member states (i.e. 13), and the population threshold is 62% of the EU population.
3  
                                                 
1 Legally, the Accession Treaty concerning the entrance of the 10 new member states in 2004 implemented the 
voting system agreed politically in the Nice Treaty. The voting rules of the Constitutional Treaty come into force 
on 1 November 2009 if it is ratified in all member states. 
2 See the Press Release “IGC 2003 – Meeting of Heads of State or Government, Brussels, 17-18 June 2004”, 
DOC/04/03, 21.06.2004. 
3 The rules that take effect in November 2004 are not those agreed at the Nice summit in December 2000. The 
deal struck at 4 a.m. at the end of the longest EU summit in history was a political commitment. The legally 
binding changes are in the Accession Treaty. Since EU leaders eventually realised how inefficient the Nice rules 2 | BALDWIN AND WIDGRÉN 
From 1 November 2009  
The Constitutional Treaty (CT) rules apply, so weighted voting is out and double majority voting is in. 
A winning coalition must represent at least 55% of the EU member states and 65% of the EU 
population. A last-minute summit compromise inserted the requirement of a winning coalition having 
at least 15 members to vote ‘yes’; however, this is irrelevant – 15 members of 25 is 60% and thus 
greater than 55%, but by the time these rules take effect, the EU should have 27 members and 55% of 
27 is 15 (Bulgaria and Romania are expected to join in 2007). The 15-member rule will be redundant 
when it takes effect. Turkey’s and Croatia’s membership will, in any case, materialise after that date. 
To come into force, the CT voting rules need ratification by all the member states. The fall-back 
position is the Nice rules, which make it possible that Turkey and Croatia could enter under the Nice 
voting framework. Therefore, in the following sections we evaluate these two voting rules in the EU-
25 and the EU-29, and especially compare the impact of Turkey’s membership on the countries of the 
EU-25, who have the most substantial say in the ratification process of the Constitution. 
3.  Tools of assessment 
‘Capacity to act’ and ‘decision-making efficiency’ are slippery concepts. There is, however, a 
quantitative tool in voting game theory that helps make things more precise. The so-called ‘passage 
probability’ gauges how likely it is that the Council would approve a randomly selected issue – 
random in the sense that each EU member state would be equally likely to vote for or against it. The 
best way to describe this measure is to explain how it is calculated. 
First, the computer calculates all the possible coalitions among EU member states, namely every 
possible combination of yes- and no-votes by EU members (there are 134 million possible coalitions 
in the EU-27). Then the computer checks each coalition to see if it is a winning coalition under the 
Nice voting system; this is done using each member’s actual weight on the three criteria (votes, 
members and population) and the three thresholds. The passage probability tells us what fraction of 
these coalitions are winning coalitions. It is called the ‘passage probability’ because it is the likelihood 
that a random proposal would attract a winning coalition, assuming all coalitions are equally likely 
(random in the sense that member states do not know what their stance would be). Admittedly, this is a 
crude measure, but it is objective, precise, and its strengths and shortcomings are clear. 
Even if the exact passage probability is meaningless (the Commission does not put forth random 
proposals), Figure 1 shows that the Nice Treaty fails on efficiency grounds since it implies a level of 
efficiency that is far, far below that of the EU-15. Indeed, the Nice reforms actually made matters 
worse. Admitting 12 new member states without any reform would have cut the passage probability to 
a third of its already low level, namely to 2.5%. With the Nice reforms, the figure drops even further 
to 2.1%. We note that the main source of the lower efficiency is the high threshold of the Nice rules 
for Council votes. A second, cruder but more transparent efficiency-measuring tool – i.e. blocking-
minority analysis – confirms these efficiency findings.  
As with the ability to act, there can be no perfect measure of power, but even imperfect measures are 
useful when considering complex voting rules since a voting scheme’s political acceptability turns 
almost completely on its power implications.  
The measures we use are called the Normalised Banzhaf Index (NBI) and the Shapley-Shubik Index 
(SSI). In plain English, they gauge how likely it is that a nation finds itself in a position to ‘break’ a 
winning coalition
4 on a randomly selected issue. Thus, the NBI and SSI tell us how influential a 
country is likely to be on a randomly chosen issue. More concretely, the NBI assumes that each 
possible coalition has the same probability of occurrence. This makes all winning coalitions equally 
                                                                                                                                                          
were, they improved efficiency by lowering the vote threshold from the 74% threshold mentioned in the Nice 
Treaty. 
4 In the literature, the term ‘swing’ is quite often used instead of ‘break’. IMPACT OF TURKEY’S MEMBERSHIP ON EU VOTING | 3 
 
likely as well and the measurement of power is simply counting the score of breaking positions for 
each player. To derive a relative measure of power this is then divided by the total number of scores. 
Of course, on particular issues various countries may be much more or much less powerful – 
especially if they are part of a like-minded group,
5 but the NBI has recently proved its worth, 
especially as an un-bribeable tool in assessing and designing voting rules. 
Figure 1. Passage probabilities in the EU Council 1957-2004 and after the entry of 
Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Turkey 
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Notes:  The figure shows the passage probability, which measures the likelihood that a randomly 
selected issue would pass in the Council of Ministers.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
To make our approach to political power more transparent, let us illustrate how it works with the 
following example. Consider a simple three-person voting body, like the Council of Ministers, with 
voters labelled as A, B and C. Suppose that A has four votes, B has two votes and C has one vote. The 
total number of votes is seven. Let us assume that five votes are needed to pass proposals. Here, we 
have three winning coalitions, AB, AC and ABC, where the actors that are able to ‘break’ a winning 
coalition are underlined. Now, A has three breaking positions, B has two and C has only one. The 
number of breaking positions is six, which means that the NBI of A is one-half, whereas the NBIs of B 
and C are one-third and one-sixth respectively. 
The SSI tries to capture a different abstract voting model. It assumes that voters have different 
tendencies to accept or reject a proposal. Suppose that these tendencies can be expressed on a line 
having the extremes of, for example, more EU spending or less spending. For instance, when the issue 
is support for hillside farmers it may be that A is the most reluctant to increase spending, then B, 
leaving C as the most in favour of increasing support for this purpose. On another day, the issue might 
be the inclusion of reindeer meat in the CAP’s price support mechanism. At that time we might derive 
a different order of preferences.  
In general, one can think that after considering a big enough number of issues, all the preference 
orders of A, B and C are equally likely. Our numerical example results in six orderings as follows: 
ABC ACB BAC BCA CAB CBA 
                                                 
5 See Baldwin et al. (2001) for details and simple numerical examples. 4 | BALDWIN AND WIDGRÉN 
where the critical voter is underlined. A critical voter exerts power as (s)he is able to break a winning 
coalition. In the first order of ABC, B can do that by breaking a winning coalition of AB. Voter A 
favours more spending on this issue than B. Therefore A is not critical. Should voter A try to break the 
winning coalition of AB by voting against spending, voter B would have already broken that as (s)he 
is less enthusiastically in favour of spending. In the example, voter A has four pivotal positions, and 
voters B and C each have one. In relative terms, we derive voting power shares of two-thirds for A and 
one-sixth for both B and C. If the SSI is a meaningful estimate for power and if power politics is able 
to explain the EU budget, these should represent A’s, B’s and C’s budget shares respectively.  
Clearly, these measures of power do not provide a detailed description of real-world voting 
procedures. For instance they lack all the strategic aspects, such as who initiates the proposal to be 
voted upon or the sequence of moves. They both contain, however, some information of voters’ 
preferences understood as tendencies to hold a favourable position. On the other hand, the measures 
consider all the possible orderings of tendencies (SSI) or presume an equal likelihood of all coalitions 
(NBI), which makes them a very long-term concept. For a general evaluation of voting rules this is a 
desirable property. 
The example above demonstrates that the NBI and SSI can have very different values. Which one 
should we then choose? There is no clear answer to that, but as a rough distinction, if one is interested 
in voting rules as such the NBI is more advantageous, however, if one is more interested in decision-
making and bargaining under certain rules knowing that actors communicate then the SSI is a far more 
suitable tool.
6 
4. Turkey’s  impact 
4.1  Implications for the EU’s capacity to act 
Turkey’s membership would have only moderate implications for the passage probabilities as Figure 1 
shows. This is not surprising since moving from 27 members to 29 does not change much. Although 
Croatia increases the number of small nations in the EU, Turkey’s large population means that there is 
little damage in efficiency. (Efficiency, if not legitimacy, tends to be higher when a large share of 
power is in the hands of just a few nations.) The vote thresholds that are used in the calculations are 
extrapolations of the current Nice/Accession Treaty threshold. In an EU-29, it is 276 out of a total of 
381 votes plus the two additional criteria: at least 15 member states and 62% of the population are 
necessary for a winning coalition. In the EU-27, it is 250 out of a total of 345 votes plus the two 
additional criteria: at least 14 member states and 62% of the population. 
As usual, the Nice voting rules – which are essentially unworkable even in the EU-27 – become even 
less viable in an EU with 29 member states. But the same does not hold for the Constitutional Treaty’s 
voting rules. The passage probability jumps drastically from the low levels of the Nice voting rules up 
to the level of the EU-12 and even higher. Surprisingly, under the Constitutional Treaty’s rules the 
European Union’s ability to act improves when its membership expands from 25 to 27 or 29 member 
states. There is only a slight drop from the EU-27 to the EU-29 from 12.9 to 12.2%.
7 
In sum, the passage-probability calculations demonstrate that Turkey’s membership does not 
deteriorate the EU’s ability to act. Under the Constitutional Treaty’s rules, the effect of Croatia and 
Turkey together is significantly smaller – one percentage point – than Turkey’s alone. The most 
                                                 
6 See for example Laruelle & Widgrén (1998), Widgrén (1994) and Laruelle & Valenciano (2004). A recent 
empirical application of the SSI is that by Kauppi & Widgrén (2004). 
7 Note that in the EU-28 (the EU-27 plus Turkey), the passage probability is 11.2%, hence lower than it is in the 
EU-29 (see Baldwin & Widgrén, 2003b). That is because the membership quota – 55% of membership – is 16 in 
both the EU-28 and the EU-29. It is thus closer to 55% in the EU-29 than in the EU-28, the exact numbers being 
55.2% and 57.1% respectively. IMPACT OF TURKEY’S MEMBERSHIP ON EU VOTING | 5 
 
important impact on the EU’s capacity to act is the switch from the Nice rules to those of the 
Constitutional Treaty. 
4.2  Impact on the distribution of power 
There are also substantial differences in the evaluation of power between the Constitutional Treaty 
rules and those of the Nice Treaty. Figure 2 shows the differences between these rules in terms of the 
NBI and SSI in the EU-25 and Figure 3 presents the respective numbers for the EU-29. The difference 
is measured in percentage points.  
Figure 2. Changes in voting power in the EU-25, from the Nice to the CT rules (percentage points) 
-0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07
Germany
Turkey
UK
France
Italy
Spain
Poland
Romania
Netherlands
Greece
Czech Republic
Belgium 
Hungary
Portugal
Sw eden
Bulgaria
Austria
Slovakia
Denmark
Finland
Croatia
Ireland
Lithuania
Latvia
Slovenia
Estonia
Cyprus
Luxemburg
Malta
NBI SSI
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Figure 2 shows that prior to Turkey’s entry the CT rules favour the four biggest nations and the six smallest 
(i.e. Latvia and smaller), if the comparison is made using the SSI. When based on the NBI, however, the 
conclusion is somewhat different: then Germany, Slovakia and smaller countries would gain from the CT 
rules compared with the Nice rules. Note that this result differs from what was obtained in Baldwin & 
Widgrén (2004b) for the EU-27, where the NBI showed exactly the same pattern as the SSI here. 
After Turkey’s accession, the biggest nations would gain more from the CT rules than in EU-25. This holds 
for both power measures. For the smallest countries, the effect is ambiguous: the NBI shows gains for 
Latvia and smaller nations whereas the SSI shows small losses. Otherwise both indices show consistent 
results.  
Figure 4 makes an explicit comparison of the Nice rules and the CT rules. The figure shows the NBI values 
under both rules. The message of the figure is very clear. The countries that would gain the most from the 
CT rules are the largest nations – Germany and Turkey. The biggest losers are Spain and Poland, but also 
the medium-sized countries from the Netherlands to Austria. That might affect these countries’ attitudes 
towards either the ratification of the Constitution or Turkey’s membership. An interested reader can find 
both index values in the EU-25 and the EU-29 in the Appendix. 6 | BALDWIN AND WIDGRÉN 
Figure 3. The power difference between the CT and Nice rules in the EU-29 (percentage points) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Figure 4. The NBI-values under the Nice rules and the CT rules in the EU-29 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Impact of enlargement on the power of the EU-25 countries 
Figures 5 and 6 evaluate the impact of enlargement from the EU-25 to an EU-29 in terms of both power 
indices. Under the Nice rules, the countries’ power losses are proportional to their sizes. Germany, the 
biggest country, loses most while the smaller nations lose less. The relative losses are of the same 
magnitude. This reflects the fact that in weighted voting, power indices tend to converge to voting weights 
if the number of actors increases and if the voting weights have a relatively small variance. 
Figure 5. Impact of enlargement on the voting power of EU-25 countries under the Nice rules 
(percentage points) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
In Figure 6, the result is more interesting. When evaluated by the NBI, the expansion from an EU-25 to an 
EU-29 benefits France and the UK.
8 The losses of other big countries are very small (the Netherlands and 
larger nations). For the countries smaller than Romania the losses slightly increase towards the smallest 
nations. The SSI, however, gives a somewhat different picture. The most notable exceptions are the biggest 
countries, especially Germany. The power loss of the Netherlands remains small. 
                                                 
8 This phenomenon is often referred to as the paradox of new members.  8 | BALDWIN AND WIDGRÉN 
Figure 6. Impact of enlargement on the voting power of EU-25 countries under the CT rules 
(percentage points) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the decision-making impact of expanding the EU from 25 to 29 member states 
through new memberships for Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Croatia. We focus on a measure of the 
EU’s capacity to act – the passage probability of a proposal in the Council of Ministers – and the 
voting power distribution among member states.  
As far as the capacity to act is concerned, enlargement is projected to have a relatively small impact, 
as long as the voting rules of the Constitutional Treaty come into effect. In particular, Turkey’s 
membership has only a negligible effect on the EU’s capacity to act. The answer, however, is quite 
different if the Constitution is rejected and the Nice Treaty rules remain in place. Under the Nice 
voting rules, the 25-to-29 member state enlargement would substantially reduce the EU-25’s ability to 
act. Thus, our findings confirm that the enlarged EU cannot function well under the Nice Treaty rules. 
It also suggests that if the Constitution is rejected, the Nice voting rules must be reformed before 
further enlargement.  
The impact of the 25-to-29 member state enlargement on the voting power of the EU incumbents 
depends heavily upon the rules. Under the CT rules, enlargement lowers the power of all the 
incumbents on a fairly even basis with the marked exception of Germany, which loses more than twice 
as much as any other member state. Under the Nice rules, the power loss is more heavily skewed 
towards the larger incumbents. Again, all incumbents are projected to lose power, but power loss 
increases progressively with member size. For example, the power loss of France under the Nice rules 
is something like seven times larger than the power loss of Malta.  IMPACT OF TURKEY’S MEMBERSHIP ON EU VOTING | 9 
 
As far as power is concerned, we find that the accession of Turkey will have a significant impact. 
Under either the Nice or the CT voting rules, Turkey would be the second-most powerful member of 
the EU-29. Under the CT rules, Turkey would be substantially more powerful than France, Italy and 
the UK, while under the Nice rules the power differences among those countries with populations of 
50 million or more would be small. Plainly, this might decrease the acceptability of the Constitutional 
Treaty or Turkey’s membership (or both). 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Power indices under the CT rules 
Member state 
NBI 
EU-29 
NBI 
EU-25 
SSI 
EU-29 
SSI 
EU-25 
Germany  0.10203 0.10407 0.13556 0.15816 
Turkey  0.09960 –  0.13152 – 
UK  0.07644 0.07614 0.09389 0.10332 
France  0.07611 0.07587 0.09339 0.10278 
Italy  0.07469 0.07475 0.09121 0.10041 
Spain  0.05491 0.05670 0.06313 0.06798 
Poland  0.05429 0.05602 0.06203 0.06694 
Romania  0.03786 –  0.03664 – 
Netherlands  0.03052 0.03715 0.02701 0.03440 
Greece 0.02495  0.03304 0.01991 0.02721 
Czech Republic  0.02474  0.03287 0.01964 0.02693 
Belgium  0.02463 0.03279 0.01950 0.02680 
Hungary  0.02453 0.03271 0.01936 0.02666 
Portugal  0.02442 0.03262 0.01922 0.02651 
Sweden  0.02314 0.03162 0.01758 0.02489 
Bulgaria  0.02250 –  0.01676 – 
Austria  0.02239 0.03103 0.01663 0.02403 
Slovakia  0.01940 0.02870 0.01288 0.02000 
Denmark  0.01940 0.02870 0.01288 0.02000 
Finland  0.01918 0.02854 0.01261 0.01975 
Croatia  0.01886 –  0.01221 – 
Ireland  0.01768 0.02737 0.01077 0.01785 
Lithuania  0.01768 0.02737 0.01077 0.01785 
Latvia  0.01628 0.02630 0.00905 0.01631 
Slovenia  0.01585 0.02598 0.00853 0.01568 
Estonia  0.01521 0.02547 0.00774 0.01487 
Cyprus  0.01445 0.02490 0.00680 0.01384 
Luxembourg  0.01413 0.02465 0.00641 0.01342 
Malta  0.01413 0.02465 0.00641 0.01342 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Table A2. Power indices under the Nice rules 
Member state 
NBI
EU-29 
NBI
EU-25 
SSI
EU-29 
SSI 
EU-25 
Germany  0.07189 0.08630 0.07814 0.09292 
Turkey  0.07189 –  0.07814 – 
UK  0.07189 0.08630 0.07814 0.09292 
France  0.07189 0.08630 0.07814 0.09292 
Italy  0.07189 0.08630 0.07814 0.09292 
Spain  0.06821 0.08159 0.07237 0.08613 
Poland  0.06821 0.08159 0.07237 0.08613 
Romania  0.03832 –  0.03615 – 
Netherlands  0.03565 0.04195 0.03340 0.03983 
Greece 0.03305  0.03881 0.03082 0.03648 
Czech Republic  0.03305  0.03881 0.03082 0.03648 
Belgium    0.03305 0.03881 0.03082 0.03648 
Hungary  0.03305 0.03881 0.03082 0.03648 
Portugal  0.03305 0.03881 0.03082 0.03648 
Sweden  0.02771 0.03246 0.02560 0.03024 
Bulgaria  0.02771 –  0.02560 – 
Austria  0.02771 0.03246 0.02560 0.03024 
Slovakia  0.01954 0.02291 0.01777 0.02099 
Denmark  0.01954 0.02291 0.01777 0.02099 
Finland  0.01954 0.02291 0.01777 0.02099 
Croatia  0.01954 –  0.01777 – 
Ireland  0.01954 0.02291 0.01777 0.02099 
Lithuania  0.01954 0.02291 0.01777 0.02099 
Latvia  0.01124 0.01324 0.00999 0.01190 
Slovenia  0.01124 0.01324 0.00999 0.01190 
Estonia  0.01124 0.01324 0.00999 0.01190 
Cyprus  0.01124 0.01324 0.00999 0.01190 
Luxembourg  0.01124 0.01324 0.00999 0.01190 
Malta  0.00841 0.00998 0.00755 0.00895 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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About CEPS 
Founded in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies is an independent policy research 
institute dedicated to producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the 
challenges facing Europe today. Funding is obtained from membership fees, contributions from 
official institutions (European Commission, other international and multilateral institutions, and 
national bodies), foundation grants, project research, conferences fees and publication sales. 
Goals 
•  To achieve high standards of academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence. 
•  To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process. 
•  To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business across the whole of 
Europe. 
•  To disseminate our findings and views through a regular flow of publications and public 
events. 
Assets and Achievements 
•  Complete independence to set its own priorities and freedom from any outside influence. 
•  Authoritative research by an international staff with a demonstrated capability to analyse policy 
questions and anticipate trends well before they become topics of general public discussion. 
•  Formation of seven different research networks, comprising some 140 research institutes from 
throughout Europe and beyond, to complement and consolidate our research expertise and to 
greatly extend our reach in a wide range of areas from agricultural and security policy to 
climate change, JHA and economic analysis. 
•  An extensive network of external collaborators, including some 35 senior associates with 
extensive working experience in EU affairs. 
Programme Structure 
CEPS is a place where creative and authoritative specialists reflect and comment on the problems 
and opportunities facing Europe today. This is evidenced by the depth and originality of its 
publications and the talent and prescience of its expanding research staff. The CEPS research 
programme is organised under two major headings: 
Economic Policy  Politics, Institutions and Security 
Macroeconomic Policy  The Future of Europe 
European Network of Economic Policy  Justice and Home Affairs 
       Research Institutes (ENEPRI)  The Wider Europe 
Financial Markets, Company Law & Taxation  South East Europe 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI)  Caucasus & Black Sea 
Trade Developments & Policy  EU-Russian/Ukraine Relations 
Energy, Environment & Climate Change   Mediterranean & Middle East 
Agricultural Policy  CEPS-IISS European Security Forum 
In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities 
within the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS task forces, lunchtime membership meetings, 
network meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences, training 
seminars, major annual events (e.g. the CEPS International Advisory Council) and internet and 
media relations. 